# [Proposal] Second Phase of wUSDM Liquidity Restoration on Venus ZKsync

- Space: [Venus Protocol](https://snapshot.box/s:venus-xvs.eth.md)
- Author: 0x5176671de05380379399B669eD276Feec99D59cB
- State: Closed
- Voting type: Single choice
- Start: 2025-06-24 16:25 UTC
- End: 2025-06-25 16:25 UTC
- Votes: 1
- Quorum: 50,000 voting power
- Discussion: https://community.venus.io/t/proposal-second-phase-of-wusdm-liquidity-restoration-on-venus-zksync/5155
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:venus-xvs.eth/proposal/0x08208c6d0ad3e067eb2144a4603ab81abc5396ea705138e2e3356a9e7a8e44cd

## Results

- For, proceed to VIP.: 821,284.83 voting power, 100.0%
- Against, do not proceed.: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

**Summary**

This proposal recommends the transfer and injection of **147,630 wUSDM** from the Venus Treasury on ZKSync to the Venus market via the `WUSDMLiquidator` contract. The goal is to **fully restore liquidity** and allow **all current wUSDM suppliers to withdraw their assets**, following the partial recovery implemented in the initial [VIP-502](https://app.venus.io/#/governance/proposal/502?chainId=56).

**Context**

On February 27, 2024, the Venus ZKsync deployment suffered a $902K loss due to a manipulation of Mountain Protocol’s wUSDM exchange rate oracle. Since then:

* $185K was recovered
* ~$400K in wUSDM was injected via VIP-502
* ~$352K in WETH, USDT, and USDC.e debt was liquidated
* A remaining ~$400K in debt is still held by the `WUSDMLiquidator` contract

Despite the partial intervention, **users holding wUSDM are still unable to exit their positions**, as liquidity remains insufficient.

**Current Status**

The following wallets currently supply wUSDM on Venus ZKsync:

|Address|Balance (wUSDM)|
| --- | --- |
|`0x7386...f85`|69,213.88|
|`0x5ac6...8b3`|33,513.72|
|`0x1e9c...380`|22,653.99|
|`0xb2e9...599`|7,680.99|
|`0xffcf...192`|2,359.52|
|`0xe4f6...7bf`|1,617.15|
|`0xccd7...487`|940.18|
|**Total**|**137,979.43 wUSDM** (~$149,151.35)|

Without further liquidity injection, these users remain locked and unable to redeem their assets.

**Proposal Details**

This proposal suggests:

* **Withdrawing 147,630 wUSDM** from the **Venus Treasury on ZKSync**:
`0xB2e9174e23382f7744CebF7e0Be54cA001D95599`
These funds were accrued from the protocol due to the high wUSDM supply rate after the exploit.
* **Supplying the funds via the existing `WUSDMLiquidator` contract**:
`0x0192ffefb1dddb9d30afcccb12f60ceaad490807`
This account was used in VIP-502 and already manages the recovery operation. Injecting liquidity through this account will **improve its health factor** and ensure transparent accounting for the remaining bad debt.
* **Allowing current wUSDM suppliers to withdraw their full balances**
and restoring the market to operational health.

**Rationale**

This injection:

* **Fulfills the restoration promise to users** still impacted by the oracle manipulation
* Avoids unnecessary prolonged lock-up of legitimate user assets
* Uses existing treasury funds **earned by the protocol itself**
* Helps improve the health factor of the `WUSDMLiquidator`, enabling better long-term debt management and reducing risk of additional protocol bad debt

**Next Steps**

If the community supports this approach, we propose:

1. Publishing a Snapshot vote to gauge sentiment on this second-phase liquidity injection
2. Proceeding with a **new VIP** on ZKSync to execute the transfer and supply

**Considerations**

* This action does **not fully close out the $400K debt** held by the `WUSDMLiquidator`. Future planning and discussion will be required to manage this liability.
* No new risk is introduced, as all execution is handled through a known and restricted contract with parameters and accounts hardcoded.

---

To vote or create proposals from an AI assistant, connect the Snapshot MCP at https://mcp.snapshot.box

