# \# UIP-15 DAO Convergence & Grant

- Space: [Usual](https://snapshot.box/s:usualmoney.eth.md)
- Author: 0xa9BADD7954333386dfA40DdD6Fa8D9019b0bcc92
- State: Passed
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2025-12-23 20:00 UTC
- End: 2025-12-29 20:00 UTC
- Votes: 100
- Discussion: https://discord.usual.money/
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:usualmoney.eth/proposal/0x73dd2059a794acb720695668a3dd9421f9fa7d0870da3e8a019c66015b512d7d

## Results

- For: 57,802,828.8 voting power, 99.2%
- Against: 188,695.59 voting power, 0.3%
- Abstain: 253,953.38 voting power, 0.4%

## Proposal

# UIP-15 DAO Convergence & Grant

Author: Usual Labs (core contributors)
Type: Governance proposal (DAO vote)
Subject: Settlement of 2024–2025 Obligations & Transition Toward Full DAO Stewardship

# **One Token, One Ownership, One IP, Two Entities**

1. **closes** what the DAO already **owes for 2024–2025** under existing agreements and real third-party operational costs,
2. **locks in the direction**: **DAO-owned IP** + **DAO-mandated, DAO-funded development** (end of “implicit” Lab control).

---

## **0) TL;DR**

If **UIP-15 passes**, the DAO approves:

1. **Payment of 2024–2025 licence royalties** owed under the **existing licence agreement** (formula-based).
2. **Reimbursement of 2024–2025 operational market-making / conversion fees** advanced by the Lab (third-party costs, not margin).
3. A **formal commitment and path** to transfer **protocol IP from the Lab to the DAO** (via the Foundation) **before end of Q1 2026**, and a new standard for future development: **roadmap + scope + DAO validation + budget + reporting**.

If **UIP-15 fails**, the DAO still has the same economic reality (contract + costs), but with **more legal, reputational, and operational risk**, and less clarity going into 2026.

---

## **1) What this UIP is — and what it is not**

### **What this UIP is**

- A **settlement proposal** for **past obligations** (2024–2025) with a **fixed, auditable formula** (royalties) and **documented third-party fees** (operations).
- A **governance reset**: the DAO explicitly states how things work going forward (IP ownership + dev mandates).

### **What this UIP is NOT**

- **Not** a blank check for the Lab.
- **Not** a permanent “rent” on protocol revenues.
- **Not** a vote to “give away the DAO.”
- **Not** an IP sale proposal (that will be a **separate** UIP with full terms, scope, and deliverables).

---

## **2) Entities, roles, and responsibilities**

### **Usual DAO**

- Formed by **USUAL holders** (USUAL can be staked into **USUALx**).
- Holds **governance authority** over the protocol: upgrades, parameters, treasury policy, and decisions about financial rights tied to protocol infrastructure.

### **Foundation (non-profit, DAO executor)**

The Foundation exists to let the DAO **act in the real world** without mixing governance with a commercial entity. It is meant to:

- **execute governance decisions legally** (contracts, payments, enforcement),
- **operate / steward protocol IP on behalf of the DAO** once transferred,
- maintain a **clean separation** between governance and any commercial operator,
- ensure **continuity and decentralization**.

### **Usual Labs**

Usual Labs is the entity that **designed, developed, audited, and launched** the protocol in its pre-DAO phase. Historically, it handled:

- financing core development and security,
- shipping initial infrastructure,
- bridging operational gaps prior to active governance,
- enabling the TGE and the decentralization transition.

**Key reality:** before the DAO existed in a fully functional form, the Lab acted as the **de-facto operator** so the system could run safely and compliantly.

---

## **3) Reminder: chronology (2022–2025)**

1. **2022–2024:** Usual Labs raised funds to build Usual and USD0.
2. Labs developed the protocol per the whitepaper commitments.
3. **May 2024:** launch of USD0. **July 2024:** launch of USD0++.
4. The Foundation was created **before the TGE**, alongside the birth of the DAO.
5. Because the IP was developed inside Labs and the DAO was not yet fully operational, a **licence agreement** was signed (July 2024) to allow legal operation of the protocol by the Foundation on behalf of the DAO.
6. Labs ensured USD0 peg stability via market making and **advanced certain mandatory operational costs**, including fees paid to the DAO and to Hashnote, plus redemption/conversion costs required by the USYC ↔ USDC cycles.

---

## **4) Principles this UIP locks in**

### **4.1 “Build for the DAO, owned by the DAO”**

- **The Lab exists to build on behalf of the DAO.**
- When development is funded or mandated by the DAO, the output is an asset of the system: **it belongs to the DAO** (via the Foundation as legal holder).

### **4.2 “Pay for delivery, not for existence”**

- Compensation must be **explicit, proportional, and tied to delivered work**.
- The Lab does **not** sit upstream of protocol revenues by default.
- Any ongoing compensation must reflect **services rendered**, not permanent claims.

### **4.3 “Governance maturity: USUAL becomes the center of authority”**

- Early structures were designed to protect the system while distribution formed.
- As issuance progresses and ownership consolidates, governance becomes **simpler** and authority increasingly rests with **USUAL governance**.

---

## **5) What UIP-15 formally approves for 2024–2025**

UIP-15 ratifies that **value generated pre-TGE and post-TGE accrues to the DAO**, while also acknowledging that the DAO must **settle obligations created during the transition**.

### **5.1 IP transfer commitment (direction + deadline)**

UIP-15 **confirms the necessity** to transfer **the full protocol IP** from Labs to the DAO (held legally via the Foundation) **before the end of Q1 2026**.

- A dedicated agreement will be proposed between Labs and the DAO/Foundation to:
    - transfer protocol IP and relevant assets (including the “front”/branding surfaces where applicable),
    - ensure that **100% of developments not covered by a specific development contract** transition into DAO ownership,
    - align the system with decentralization goals.

### **5.2 Future post-TGE development standards**

Any future development relationship between DAO and Labs must include:

- a published **roadmap** and **spec / scope** submitted **in advance**,
- DAO validation of scope and budget.

---

## **6) Settlement item #1 — Licence agreement royalties (2024–2025)**

### **6.1 Why the IP License Agreement Exists**

The **licence agreement** was put in place to reflect a simple reality:

- In **2024 and 2025**, the **Labs / DAO and the Foundation** needed **clear legal rights** to **operate the protocol** (deploy, maintain, run, etc.).
- The protocol’s **initial development** was **funded by Labs** through **multiple fundraising rounds**, meaning Labs carried the early effort of building and maturing the protocol’s **IP**.
- Because some parts of the development and IP had **not yet been transferred to the DAO**, a **legal framework** was required to enable their use and to **structure the relationship** between **two distinct entities** (Labs on one side, the DAO/Foundation on the other).

**Key point:** the **royalty model** reflects **past development effort**, not a perpetual upstream claim. **UIP-15** is meant to **settle historical obligations**, and the governance path explicitly moves toward **DAO-owned IP**—which naturally makes the interim licence model **temporary** and ultimately **obsolete**, avoiding anything that could be perceived as an ongoing **rent** from Labs on the DAO.

---

### **6.2 Royalty formula (contractual)**

Royalties are defined as: 12.5 bps (0.125%) of annual TVL TWAP

### **6.3 Amounts owed (excl. VAT)**

| **Year** | **TVL TWAP** | **Royalty rate** | **Amount owed** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2024 | $192,000,000 | 0.125% | **$240,000** |
| 2025 | $773,404,151 | 0.125% | **$966,755** |
| **TOTAL** |  |  | **$1,206,755** |

**License Agreement:**

[view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HWuHSW6lRoZktrXx_mDc1Mc-bzQ9UJxN/view?usp=sharing)

**Fee calculation for 2024 and 2025**

- 2024 & 2025: [view](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Q6L0oQWDuUOuWTdHOR5s5SOlyblv8xvfE-VUea26G2A/edit?usp=sharing)

---

## **7) Settlement item #2 — Reimbursement of operational fees advanced by the Lab (2024–2025)**

### **7.1 Why these costs exist**

Between 2024 and mid-2025, Usual Labs was the sole arbitrageur for USD0 and operated the market-making activity at a loss to maintain the USD0 peg during periods of secondary market volatility. Usual Labs facilitated over $675M in volume through the USD0 minting and redemption mechanism. In this process, the Labs paid 10 basis points to the DAO and 10 basis points to Hashnote in fees. 

---

1. **Redeeming USD0 → USYC initially cost 10 bps in fees to the DAO**
2. **Redeeming USYC → USDC** via Hashnote **initially cost 10 bps in fees to Hashnote**

These steps generate real third-party operational costs that:

- are **not margin**,
- were **advanced by the Lab** to maintain continuity,
- existed before the DAO treasury could reliably fund operations.

UIP-15 asks the DAO to refund these advances.

### **7.2 Amounts to reimburse**

- **2024:** $152,000
- **2025:** $1,406,626 *(USYC redemption + USD0 conversion operational costs)*

**Total reimbursements (2024–2025):** $1,558,626.

### **7.3 Accounting Document**

Transaction details: [view](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xlnW_9bz-9ml-XAv5ezHbKnhdV9JzMH3ztWMNS60pLo/edit?usp=sharing)

---

## **8) Total financial impact**

- **Royalties (excl. VAT):** $1,206,755
- **Reimbursements:** $1,558,626

**Total approved outflow:** $2,765,381 *(plus VAT where applicable on royalties).*

---

## **9) Payment mechanics (how funds move, and why)**

### **Funding source**

**DAO treasury.**

### **Flow (to keep governance / operations legally separated)**

1. DAO allocates funds to the **Foundation** (DAO executor).
2. Foundation pays in USDC:
    - the Lab for **royalties owed** (per contract),
    - the Lab for **operational reimbursements** (per documented third-party costs).

This structure preserves:

- legal enforceability,
- separation between DAO governance and any commercial operator,
- auditability (clear sender/receiver + documentation trail).

---

## **10) On-chain vote options**

- **FOR** — Approve UIP-15 as written (settlement + transition commitments).
- **AGAINST** — Reject the settlement and transition commitments.
- **ABSTAIN** — No position.

---

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