# OIP-265 : Wind down public liquidity provision and make the Overtime treasury the sole liquidity provider across all pools.

- Space: [Overtime Governance](https://snapshot.box/s:thalesgov.eth.md)
- Author: 0x835d18b633532a15F188f896dea31685761eB672
- State: Closed
- Voting type: Single choice
- Start: 2026-06-24 08:49 UTC
- End: 2026-06-27 08:49 UTC
- Votes: 4
- Quorum: 1 voting power
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:thalesgov.eth/proposal/0xe3dd65d81c6d3aa9d3b4d91ac4acf871e80eb984bb3c0666db4d1f6a2b59cb95

## Results

- For: 4 voting power, 100.0%
- Against: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

| id | Title | Status | Author | Description | Discussions to | Created |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| OIP-265 | End Public Liquidity Provision and Internalize Protocol Liquidity | Draft | Danijel | Wind down public liquidity provision and make the Overtime treasury the sole liquidity provider across all pools. | https://discord.com/invite/overtime-io | 2026-06-22 |

## Simple Summary

This OIP proposes ending public liquidity provision on Overtime. Going forward, the Overtime treasury becomes the sole liquidity provider across all liquidity pools. Technically, this is realized by requesting the withdrawal of all non-treasury wallets from the protocol's liquidity pools and restricting new external deposits.

## Abstract

The Overtime Liquidity Providing contracts are the backbone of the protocol. They take the other side of user bets, and their health directly determines the odds, limits, and volume the protocol can support.

Today these pools accept liquidity from external users alongside the treasury. The core question this OIP raises is simple: why should the protocol leak a large share—on the order of 50%—of its profits to external liquidity providers when it does not need to.

This is sharpened by the recent history of external LPs. When the protocol most needed liquidity, and when LP performance was not great, most external LPs exited. Now that yields are proven, they are back—capturing returns precisely at the point where the protocol has already done the hard work of building, de-risking, and proving the system. External liquidity does not show up to share the risk; it shows up to share the reward.

It is further complicated by the Polymarket and Mollybet integrations. The protocol and treasury must supply these integrations with liquidity and carry the associated manual accounting, but the treasury does not reap the full benefit of the integrations' performance. This structurally leaves the treasury at a disadvantage—always on the hook to provide, without capturing the full upside it underwrites.

This OIP proposes ending public liquidity provision entirely, making the Overtime treasury the only liquidity provider across all pools. External liquidity providers would be requested to withdraw their capital, and new external deposits would be closed. The rationale rests on four points:

1.  **The protocol should no longer take on the risk of other people's funds.** Overtime is non-custodial—funds sit in smart contracts, not with the protocol—but the protocol nonetheless bears the full risk of guaranteeing those contracts' safety for everyone who deposits. With the rapid rise of AI-assisted exploit discovery, that risk grows continuously, and a single large exploit is a survival-level event. The protocol should not aim to carry the smart contract risk of external funds against a risk surface it alone underwrites and cannot fully cap.
    
2.  **The protocol should not leak ~50% of its profits.** External LPs leave when liquidity is most needed and return once yields are proven, taking roughly half of pool profits without bearing the risk that produced them.
    
3.  **Integrations leave the treasury structurally disadvantaged.** The Polymarket and Mollybet integrations require the treasury to provide liquidity and manual accounting while not capturing the full benefit of their performance.
    
4.  **Revenue is better retained for buyback and burn.** The protocol already directs revenue into $OVER buyback and burn. With current positive revenue trends, the protocol does not need external liquidity and should not leak profit to fund it.
    

## Motivation

### The protocol underwrites all smart contract risk

Liquidity pools operate on smart contracts that the protocol designs, audits, deploys, and maintains. Regardless of who deposits, it is the protocol that takes on the responsibility and the reputational and financial consequences of keeping those contracts safe.

That risk is no longer static. The rise of AI dramatically lowers the cost and raises the speed of exploit discovery. Adversaries can now scan, fuzz, and reason about contract logic at a scale that was not previously feasible. The probability and potential severity of a large exploit therefore rise continuously over time.

In that environment, a single large exploit is a survival-level event for the protocol. The protocol alone underwrites this expanding risk and cannot fully cap it. Internalizing liquidity concentrates the risk where it already effectively sits—with the protocol—rather than spreading it to external participants who cannot price it.

### The protocol should not leak ~50% of its profits

External liquidity is often framed as added capacity the protocol depends on. The recent history says otherwise. When the protocol most needed liquidity, and when LP performance was weak, most external LPs exited. Now that yields are proven, they are back.

This is a structurally asymmetric arrangement. External LPs were absent for the difficult, unproven phase and present for the rewarding, proven one. Yet in exchange they take a large share—on the order of 50%—of pool profits, while bearing none of the smart contract risk that the protocol underwrites and none of the cost of proving the system in the first place.

The question is therefore not whether the protocol can attract external liquidity—it clearly can, now that yields are proven. The question is why the protocol should leak roughly half of its profits to capital that does not share the risk and was not present when it mattered. With the treasury fully capable of meeting liquidity demand, there is no reason to.

### Integrations leave the treasury structurally disadvantaged

The Polymarket and Mollybet integrations make this more complicated, not less. To support these integrations, the protocol and treasury must provide liquidity and carry the associated manual accounting. The treasury does the work of standing behind these integrations operationally and financially.

However, the treasury does not reap the full benefit of the integrations' performance. The result is a structural disadvantage: the treasury is always on the hook to provide liquidity and absorb the operational and accounting overhead, while the upside generated by these integrations is shared rather than fully retained. As integrations grow, this misalignment grows with them.

Making the treasury the sole liquidity provider resolves this. The treasury that bears the obligation and the accounting burden of these integrations should also capture their full performance, rather than provisioning them at a disadvantage.

### Revenue is better retained than leaked

The protocol already directs revenue into $OVER buyback and burn. Profit shared with external liquidity providers is, in effect, revenue that leaks out of the protocol instead of supporting $OVER.

With current positive revenue trends, the protocol does not need external liquidity, and it does not need to leak liquidity-pool profit to fund it. Retaining the full economics of the pools—rather than sharing roughly half with external LPs—channels more value into buyback and burn, strengthens $OVER, and improves the protocol's long-term survivability.

## Specification

This OIP entails the Overtime Protocol DAO and Overtime Treasury DAO to end public liquidity provision and make the Overtime treasury the sole liquidity provider across all liquidity pools.

The proposed changes are:

1.  Close new external deposits into all Overtime Liquidity Providing contracts, including liquidity provisioned to the Polymarket and Mollybet integrations. Only treasury and treasury-controlled wallets remain eligible to provide liquidity.
    
2.  Request the withdrawal of all non-treasury wallets from the liquidity pools. All external liquidity providers are notified and given a clear window to withdraw their capital and accrued returns.
    
3.  After the withdrawal window, the protocol may forcefully request and process the withdrawal of any remaining non-treasury liquidity from the pools, returning each external provider's withdrawable balance to its wallet, so that the pools are composed exclusively of treasury-provided liquidity.
    
4.  The Overtime treasury becomes the sole liquidity provider across all pools and integrations, and retains full discretion over how liquidity is allocated across products, markets, and integrations.
    
5.  The protocol continues to direct revenue into $OVER buyback and burn. Liquidity-pool profit that was previously shared with external providers is retained by the protocol.
    

For the avoidance of doubt, "non-treasury wallets" means any liquidity provider that is not the Overtime treasury, a treasury-associated wallet, or a treasury-controlled multisig. The forced withdrawal mechanism only returns external providers' own withdrawable liquidity to them; it does not confiscate or redirect external capital.

Treasury DAO retains discretion over timing, cadence, execution path, and operational details, and may carry out the transition gradually if needed to avoid unnecessary liquidity disruption.

This change is fully reversible. Nothing in this OIP permanently removes external liquidity provision. If the situation changes and Overtime again needs external liquidity providers, public liquidity provision can be re-enabled by reopening external deposits on the Overtime Liquidity Providing contracts, without requiring contract redeployment.

## Rationale

============================  
Snapshot limit reached, will post github link with the full text:  
  
https://github.com/thales-markets/overtime-improvement-proposals/blob/main/OIPs/OIP-265.md

## Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

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