# TIP-011 Spice Bazaar Upgrade to Support Fixed Price Auctions

- Space: [TempleDAO](https://snapshot.box/s:templedao.eth.md)
- Author: 0x4D6175d58C5AceEf30F546C0d5A557efFa53A950
- State: Passed
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2026-10-05 20:21 UTC
- End: 2026-10-08 20:21 UTC
- Votes: 5
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:templedao.eth/proposal/0xe6d2cb54712ddbb812ea991119691b271ae8d187d85c6e64db1f577378ce510e

## Results

- For: 5,060,332.8 voting power, 100.0%
- Against: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

# 1.1 Summary

Previous Spice Bazaar Auctions have been implemented in two ways: 1) Bidders bid USDS for TGLD; 2) Bidders bid TGLD for volatile holdings selected by the Treasury ([TIP-003](https://snapshot.org/#/s:templedao.eth/proposal/0x01b1d23cc042595a989db038571f04234948ec6450ff98e2c6c9664c616820050)).

In past Auctions, the Treasury would pre-fund with a lot of designated Sell Tokens at a fixed nominal size e.g. 1,000,000 SPICE. Users could place non-withdrawable Bid Token bids e.g. TGLD until the end of the Bid Epoch to bid on the SPICE Token. After each bid was placed, the price for SPICE would go up accordingly.

Once the Auction was over, the Bidders could claim their pro-rata share of the Auction token lot e.g. a user who had deposited 1% of the total bid would receive 1% of the SPICE token lot. The Treasury would then burn the Bid Token that was received during the Auction.

# 1.2 Motivation

After conducting a number of variable price auctions, the Logicians have identified several areas of improvements for the Auction format:

(a) Stochastic Price - The final lot price was unpredictable. The quoted unit price increases after each Bid and large Bids played a dominant role in shaping the final price. To hedge its own price risk, Treasury auctioned multiple smaller lots for a given Spice Token to avoid being locked into an unfavorable exchange rate in the event that Bid Token demand was lower than expected.

(b) No Withdrawals - Once they made their deposit, Bidders could not remove their Bids in response to the current price. While this restriction did mitigate price griefing, it increased price risk for early Bidders and served to discourage bidding until large bids had come in.

(c) Static Token Lot Size - The size of the initial Sell Token lot for the given Auction caps the theoretical demand. Even if the market demand was high, there was no way for the Treasury to increase the size of the lot after the start of the Auction. This meant that potential Bidders would be locked out even if they wanted to transact at current price levels. This created friction for supply to meet demand.

# 1.3 Proposal

An Auction format with a token exchange rate that is fixed and known at time of Deposit may improve the UX and promote market clearance. Existing issues for variable price auctions would be addressed while providing price certainty for Bidders and additional funding flexibility for the Treasury.

Fixed Price Auction format will support ANY suitable token pair including TGLD or TEMPLE pairings (see TIP-010).

Fixed Price Auction can be divided into 3 distinct phases:

(a) Deposit Epoch

-   Token Pairing is set
    
-   Price is posted (immutable and on-chain)
    
-   Users may make Bids or withdraw their Bid
    
-   Duration (typically 3 - 7 days)
    

(b) Fulfillment Epoch

-   Starts immediately after Deposit ends
    
-   Treasury executes Full or Partial Fills
    
-   Duration (typically 3 - 7 days)
    

(c) Claim Epoch

-   Starts immediately after Fulfillment ends
    
-   Claims are open for token entitlement including refunds
    
-   Duration (indefinite)
    

(A) Deposit Epoch - The Treasury initiates the Fixed Price Auction by setting the following Parameters:

-   Start Time (when Deposits will be open)
    
-   Duration (how long Deposits will be open)
    
-   Buy <> Sell Token Pair e.g. TGLD and USDS
    
-   Fixed Exchange Rate for the Buy <> Sell Token
    

Importantly, the Treasury must first announce and establish a fixed price e.g. 0.0466 USDS per TGLD. This exchange rate is hardcoded for the given Auction and cannot be changed. In an Emergency, the Auction may be canceled and refunds would be provided.

If the Bidder likes the price, they may deposit the Buy Token at any time while Deposits are open. They may also add more or withdraw the Buy Token at any time before the Deposit Epoch ends.

(B) Fulfillment Epoch - Fulfillment begins once Deposits are closed and total demand is locked in for the Buy token. The Bidder can no longer withdraw (or add more) Buy Token until the Fulfillment Epoch is complete.  
  
During Fulfillment, the Treasury has 3 options:

(a) Fill 100% of the order // Fully Funded  
- Users receives USDS and no TGLD refund  
- Treasury pays 0.0466 USDS per TGLD and withdraws 100% of TGLD

(b) Fill < 100% of the order // Partially Funded  
- Users receives USDS and refund for any unfilled TGLD  
- Treasury pays 0.0466 USDS per TGLD and withdraws TGLD proportional to funding %

(c) Cancel the Auction  
- Effectively the same as a 0% order fill  
- Published price is void and any deposited tokens are fully refunded

Fixed Price Auction behaves like a Limit Order. In a Limit Order, whatever doesn’t get filled e.g. TGLD or TEMPLE will be returned along with the portion of the order that did get filled e.g. USDS. Price manipulation is not possible because the Treasury cannot change the price that was published at the start of the Deposit Epoch. The Treasury can only choose how much of the order it wants to fill. Similarly, we can now allow Bidders to withdraw (or add more) because their Bid has no effect on the fixed unit price.

The Treasury has maximum flexibility to meet funding demand as it deems fit. Given that the fixed exchange rate is 0.0466 USDS per TGLD in this example, and suppose that 100mm TGLD was deposited, the full funding level can be defined as 4.66mm USDS.

If the Treasury chooses to fully fund 4.66mm USDS, then Bidders will be able to claim USDS at 0.0466 USDS per TGLD deposited. In this full funding scenario, they would receive no TGLD refund and 4.66mm USDS pro rata while the Treasury would claim 100mm TGLD.

If the Treasury chooses to partially fund using 2.33mm USDS i.e. 50% funding, the Bidders will be able to claim 2.33mm USDS pro rata and 50% of their initial TGLD deposit would be refunded back to them. The Treasury would only claim 50mm TGLD.

(C) Claim Epoch - Once Fulfillment is over, the Claim Epoch will begin and both the Bidders and the Treasury will be able to withdraw whatever tokens to which they are entitled including any applicable refunds and fills.

# 1.4 Implementation

Enclaves of Structure and Logic will create new Fixed Price Auction Contracts for the Spice Bazaar under the general framework outlined above. Certain features or specifications may be modified, refined, or removed altogether during technical Implementation. Full documentation will be available once contracts are finished.

> YES vote → Authorise the development of the Fixed Price Auction to support Protocol liquidity as outlined.

> NO vote → Decline to authorise the development of the Fixed Price Auction to support Protocol liquidity as outlined.

---

To vote or create proposals from an AI assistant, connect the Snapshot MCP at https://mcp.snapshot.box

