# Bridge Message Reconciliation Mechanism

- Space: [Noon](https://snapshot.box/s:nooncapital.eth.md)
- Author: 0xdB06619E83B75DD99aAC8Fb06287cb0E4fF9d509
- State: Passed
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2026-05-27 19:54 UTC
- End: 2026-05-30 19:54 UTC
- Votes: 2
- Discussion: https://forum.noon.capital/t/proposal-bridge-message-reconciliation-mechanism/100?u=filipenoon
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:nooncapital.eth/proposal/0xcc926e435f7b96f9818ec380be022e1635b7687f2f136139eee7c8b23cc3ba2e

## Results

- For: 518.79 voting power, 100.0%
- Against: 0 voting power, 0.0%
- Abstain: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

Summary

Following an April 2026 LayerZero incident that left 12,728.9 sUSN stuck in an unrecoverable bridge message, the Noon team is proposing a narrow, timelocked on-chain mechanism to reconcile the lock-mint invariant when bridge messages fail beyond all standard recovery paths.

This is not a general recovery, minting, or withdrawal authority. It is a single-purpose tool scoped exclusively to provably stuck bridge messages, gated by multisig execution, a 48-hour on-chain timelock, and per-incident public disclosure including the exact GUID.

Rationale

Bridge risk is structural for any multi-chain protocol. Noon has minimized exposure by building its own bridge infrastructure, but residual risk from underlying messaging layers (LayerZero, Hyperlane) cannot be fully eliminated.

The sUSN lock-mint model preserves the invariant lockedSupply == mintedSupplyAcrossDestinations under normal flow. When a message becomes genuinely unrecoverable (stuck DVN verification, executor failure, lzReceive reverts, etc.), the invariant breaks until manually reconciled.

Establishing this mechanism now, through clean governance, is more responsible than improvising under pressure when the next incident occurs. The choice is between handling failures transparently with on-chain guardrails or handling them ad-hoc.

Every use of the function requires public disclosure on the Governance Forum with the exact TXID and GUID, community notification via Telegram, and a 48-hour timelock window during which the action is publicly visible and revocable.

Proposed Change

Add two multisig-restricted functions to sUSN, operating as a two-step pattern with an enforced 48-hour delay:

	•	requestHandleFixIssue(bytes32 guid, string reason): registers a pending reconciliation, starts the timelock, emits a public event.
	•	validateExecuteHandleIssue(bytes32 guid): executes after the timelock elapses, emits StuckMessageReconciled with GUID, amount, and recipient.

The 48-hour MIN_TIMELOCK is enforced inside the contract and cannot be bypassed or shortened by the multisig.

Voting Period

This voting period, will be of 1 week. The changes will only be implemented if the proposal passes.

We welcome constructive feedback as we work to establish transparent, on-chain guardrails for bridge failures before they are needed again.[](url)

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