# PROPOSAL of BURNING

- Space: [GMX](https://snapshot.box/s:gmx.eth.md)
- Author: 0x9908255F7F2dFfcCaa14448a2356E5A8fD8e8bC1
- State: Rejected
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2026-01-20 17:13 UTC
- End: 2026-01-23 17:13 UTC
- Votes: 82
- Discussion: https://gov.gmx.io/t/proposal-we-urgently-need-burning/4998
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:gmx.eth/proposal/0xfd41555f0b09cacc25f83c2f9902ed7d5d8d2f75f7a01832883efa7aa242c226

## Results

- For: 14,365.79 voting power, 15.0%
- Against: 81,217.73 voting power, 85.0%

## Proposal

Key data (verified)

GMX market cap ~ $73.3M (circulating ~10.38M).

Value accrual to GMX stakers: “earning 27% of fees” (GMX docs).

Implementation detail: on V2 the 27% of fees is used to reacquire GMX and then distributed to stakers; on V1 it was 30%. On V2, 10% of fees goes to the treasury and 63% goes to GM liquidity providers.

Recent fee run-rate (DefiLlama): Fees 30d ~ $2.6M and “Holders revenue 30d” ~ $702k (consistent with ~27%).

Treasury ~ $35M: explicitly referenced in a governance discussion.

Benchmark GNS/Gains: BB&D was introduced to reward stakers with ~55% of revenue and today that allocation is used for buyback & burn.

[PROPOSAL] GMX: “Buyback & Burn Accelerator” (6-month pilot) + Partial burn of the staker fee bucket
TL;DR

Without changing the total allocation to stakers (27% on V2 / 30% on V1), we propose to burn a portion of the GMX already reacquired with fees, instead of distributing 100% of it.

Launch a pilot using up to $3.5M from the treasury for a DCA buyback & burn over 180 days (with guardrails).

Goal: reduce selling pressure, create a measurable scarcity narrative, and improve competitiveness versus “burn-heavy” token models (e.g., GNS).

1) Problem

Over recent months, the GMX token has experienced a sharp decline in price/valuation even though the protocol continues to generate fees. This risks creating a vicious cycle:

perception of “a token that pays yield but keeps dropping” →

stakers selling rewards (reacquired GMX) →

constant pressure on the order book / AMM →

negative narrative and weaker marginal demand.

GMX already routes value to the token via buyback and distribution to stakers (27% of fees, documented).
The key issue is how that value is monetized: if most of it becomes “immediately sellable cashflow,” the tokenomics can turn into persistent sell pressure.

2) Current state (numbers)
Metric	Value
Market cap	~ $73.3M
Fees (30 days)	~ $2.6M
Value to “token holders/stakers” (30d)	~ $702k
Stakers allocation on V2	27% fees via buyback→distribution
Treasury	~ $35M
3) Benchmark: why the market “understands” GNS

Gains has pushed an extremely simple narrative: a large share of revenue goes into buyback & burn (documented as ~55% across official descriptions).
This doesn’t guarantee price appreciation, but it helps: it creates an easy-to-read story (“increasing scarcity”) and reduces net supply over time.

4) Proposal (two levers)
Lever A — Partial burn of the buyback already allocated to stakers (without touching the LP share)

Today (V2): 27% fees → buyback GMX → 100% distributed to stakers.
Proposed (V2, 6-month pilot):

18% fees → buyback GMX → distributed to stakers

9% fees → buyback GMX → BURNED

In practice: we are not removing value from the token; we’re converting part of “immediately sellable cashflow” into irreversible scarcity, while keeping a meaningful reward for stakers.

Note: 18% + 9% = 27%, so the overall staker bucket does not change on V2; only the final destination changes.

For V1 (if still relevant): same logic applied to the 30% bucket (e.g., 20% distribution + 10% burn).

Estimated impact (order of magnitude, using 30d data):

If “holders revenue 30d” is ~ $702k, and we burn ~1/3, monthly burn is ~ $234k.

With GMX at ~ $7.06, that’s ~ 33k GMX/month ≈ ~398k GMX/year (price-dependent).



FOR — (18% distribution / 9% burn on V2) + Treasury accelerator cap $3.5M

AGAINST — No changes

---

To vote or create proposals from an AI assistant, connect the Snapshot MCP at https://mcp.snapshot.box

