# [GIP-286] Protocol Surface Reduction: v3.0 admins and Obsolete Bytecode

- Space: [Gearbox](https://snapshot.box/s:gearbox.eth.md)
- Author: 0xab025D1Cb886D8464f6aECfC7144C6c4D07aa6D8
- State: Rejected
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2026-06-24 17:11 UTC
- End: 2026-06-27 17:11 UTC
- Votes: 12
- Quorum: 200,000,000 voting power
- Discussion: https://discord.com/channels/841203475606011905/1517478589401006150
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:gearbox.eth/proposal/0x7e72956928ac2a712da3a9c620a1863b4a81ac6ead589deae6a36d29b6fde257

## Results

- For: 169,265,048.25 voting power, 100.0%
- Against: 0 voting power, 0.0%
- Abstain: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

# Summary

This proposal bundles two precautionary cleanups that touch no live positions and affect no active market, user, or curator:

1. Close the legacy V3.0 markets, where the pools now carry zero debt and borrowing is blocked: pause the controller, remove every pausable and unpausable admin, and remove governance's ability to queue further updates.
2. Forbid the init code of obsolete integration and price-feed contracts in the [BytecodeRepository](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1cE2B1BE96a082b1b1539F80d5D8f82Ec06a0f9A) so they can no longer be deployed.

Both actions shrink what the protocol has to trust and keep in scope for the bug bounty, at no operational cost to the DAO.

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# Motivation

As Gearbox completes its transition to the Permissionless architecture, the legacy V3.0 system and the early Permissionless rollout carry leftover permissions and registered code that are no longer needed. Every remaining admin role is a dependency that has to be trusted and monitored, and every deployable contract is code the DAO has to keep audited and in scope for the bug bounty. Trimming what is no longer used is cheap insurance: it removes ways the protocol could be affected, even theoretically, while costing nothing operationally.

# Specification

## Part 1: Close the legacy V3.0 markets and remove all admin roles

The legacy V3.0 system still carries a full set of privileged roles: pausable and unpausable admins at the ACL level, a queue admin on the Governor, and a live ControllerTimelockV3. Together these can pause and unpause the legacy pools and credit managers and queue parameter updates to the V3.0 markets.

The legacy V3.0 pools now hold zero debt and borrowing is blocked. With no active borrowing, neither pausing nor risk-parameter updates serve any protective purpose: the reason these controls exist, to halt activity or adjust risk during an incident, no longer applies. Leaving them in place only enlarges the protocol's risk surface: privileged roles that can still act on a system being wound down, with no operational benefit to offset the trust they require.

It is therefore proposed to fully decommission control over the legacy V3.0 markets, in two batches.

First, pause the ControllerTimelockV3 and remove every pausable and unpausable admin from the legacy ACL. After this, no remaining key can pause or unpause the legacy pools and credit managers. Because borrowing is already blocked and debt is zero, removing the pause rights guarantees that nothing can block suppliers from exiting their positions.

Second, remove the ability to queue any further update to the V3.0 markets. The Governor queue admin is reassigned to the dead address and the multisig is removed as queue admin, leaving a burn address that no one controls as the only queue admin. This effectively removes any rights to update any V3.0 market, closing them: since the pools hold zero debt and borrowing is blocked, no risk updates are needed, and with all pausable admins removed nothing can block suppliers from exiting.

## Part 2: Forbid obsolete bytecode in the BytecodeRepository

The [BytecodeRepository](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1cE2B1BE96a082b1b1539F80d5D8f82Ec06a0f9A) stores audited bytecode that can be deployed permissionlessly across chains. A number of registered integrations and price feeds are obsolete: they are not used by any active market and are not intended to be deployed.

While their init code stays allowed, that code remains deployable and stays inside the audited and bug-bounty surface of the protocol. Forbidding the init code of these obsolete entries removes them from the deployable set, reducing the amount of code the DAO is responsible for securing and lowering overall smart contract risk, with no impact on any contract actually in use.

It is therefore proposed to call `forbidInitCode` (via `configureGlobal` on the BytecodeRepository) for the following contract types and versions, under the batch **"Forbid initcode for obsolete integrations and price feeds"**:

# Execution flow
The batch with queue admin removal will be executed after removal of all pausable/unpausable admins. Done to perform the last market checks before executing irreversible queue admin removal.

# Txs log
Txs log is available [here](https://gearboxprotocol.notion.site/GIP-286-384145c1622480648292d5878dd0c66d?source=copy_link)
Md5 checksums are b9de31ad03c43129fdc9ba0f426b4691, 8fddc87007e661d77a38e71a0c50671d, a7298da8698e7987325cfd100c6a6dbe, f84ee9c2de0f69b86ed471db4fa7b318

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