# CCIP-124 - Allow CCMOON DAO to build a Moon Bridge between Arbitrum One & Nova

- Space: [Moons Governance](https://snapshot.box/s:cryptomods.eth.md)
- Author: 0x8b0365e1B9C29F2d34C12D2DFd7d35DceBe93D36
- State: Passed
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2026-01-06 17:31 UTC
- End: 2026-01-13 17:31 UTC
- Votes: 19
- Quorum: 1 voting power
- Discussion: https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrencyMeta/s/8f1jiJnEiq
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:cryptomods.eth/proposal/0x0c7e5318ba1fc5f4134d3c5f9049fd185a55e2c3076c8f21b6cef2999b72bdfa

## Results

- For: 1,985,214.65 voting power, 100.0%
- Against: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

# Governance Proposal: Have the CCMOON DAO Deploy and Operate a MOON Bridge 

# Summary

This proposal authorizes the CCMOON DAO to design, deploy, and operate a liquidity-backed fast bridge for MOON between Arbitrum Nova and Arbitrum One, hosted at moonbridge.cc.

The bridge will improve user experience, restore cross-chain mobility for MOON, and create a sustainable operational revenue stream through relayer fees. The DAO is authorized to cover reasonable operating expenses required to run the bridge, including infrastructure and maintenance costs.

# Motivation

MOON currently exists across multiple Arbitrum environments, but users face friction, delays, or limited options when moving MOON between chains. This creates:

* Fragmented liquidity
* Poor user experience
* Reduced utility for MOON holders
* Lost opportunity for DAO-owned infrastructure revenue

A DAO-operated bridge solves these issues by:

* Enabling fast, predictable MOON transfers between Nova and One
* Improving accessibility for users and applications
* Allowing the DAO to control risk, limits, and economics
* Generating non-speculative revenue tied to real usage

# High-Level Design

# Bridge Type

* Liquidity-backed fast bridge
* Separate bridge contracts deployed on:
   * Arbitrum Nova
   * Arbitrum One
* DAO seeds initial MOON liquidity on both chains

This is not a canonical bridge and does not rely on L1 challenge periods. Transfers are fast and liquidity-constrained by design.

# Security and Threat Model

The bridge is designed under the assumption that:

* Bad actors will attempt abuse
* Frontends can be bypassed
* Relayers can go offline
* RPCs can fail
* Users may attempt oversized or spam transactions

Security is enforced through:

* Onchain replay protection
* Conservative operational controls
* DAO-controlled relayers
* A pause mechanism
* Transparent onchain actions

# Relayer Architecture

* The bridge is operated by two DAO-controlled relayers
* Each relayer runs on its own VPS
* Relayers:
   * Monitor bridge requests
   * Execute fulfillments on the destination chain
   * Execute refunds when necessary

# Control Model

* Relayers and operational parameters are controlled by DAO officers
* A multisig manages operational changes
* All operational actions are onchain and publicly auditable

# Replay Protection

* Each bridge request has a unique request ID
* Requests can be fulfilled only once
* Replay protection is enforced onchain
* Multiple relayers can operate safely without risk of double fulfillment

# Fee Structure

# ETH Relayer Fee

* Users pay a fixed ETH relayer fee when requesting a bridge
* Fee is paid directly to the relayer wallet that fulfills the request
* Purpose:
   * Cover gas costs
   * Cover VPS and infrastructure costs
   * Support reliable operations

Any excess profit beyond operating costs is accounted for offchain and may be redirected to DAO-approved uses such as subreddit distributions or treasury operations.

# MOON Fees

Two MOON-denominated fees apply:

# 1) Fulfillment Fee

* 1% of the fulfilled amount
* Applies only to MOON received on the destination chain

# 2) Refund Fee (when liquidity is insufficient)

* 1% of the refunded amount
* Capped at 100 MOON (so users will pay at most 100 moon)
* Applies only to the portion refunded on the source chain

# Partial Fulfillment and Refunds

If destination liquidity is insufficient:

* The relayer immediately fulfills available liquidity
* The relayer immediately refunds the remainder
* Fees are applied proportionally:
   * Fulfillment fee on fulfilled portion
   * Refund fee on refunded portion

# Example

* Requested: 1000 MOON
* Destination liquidity: 500 MOON

Outcome:

* 495 MOON received on destination
* 495 MOON refunded on source
* 10 MOON total fees
* ETH relayer fee charged once

# Zero-Liquidity Behavior

If destination liquidity is zero:

* The request is still allowed
* User receives a full refund minus the refund fee
* ETH relayer fee still applies

This discourages spam while preserving predictable behavior.

# Limits and Controls

* No maximum per-transaction cap
* No daily net outflow cap
* Risk is managed via:
   * Liquidity depth
   * Pause mechanism
   * Relayer oversight
   * Transparent operations

# Pause Mechanism

* The bridge can be paused immediately in emergencies
* Controlled by DAO officers via multisig (exact requirements TBD)
* A pause halts:
   * New requests
   * Fulfillments
* Used for incident response or unexpected behavior

# User Cancellation

* Users may cancel a request only if no fulfillment has started
* ETH relayer fees are not refunded on cancellation
* Once fulfillment begins, cancellation is no longer possible

# Frontend and Hosting

* The bridge frontend will be hosted at [moonbridge.cc](http://moonbridge.cc)
* The UI will:
   * Display destination liquidity
   * Show maximum bridgeable amount
   * Warn users when liquidity is insufficient
   * Provide full pre-transaction quotes, including:
      * Expected destination amount
      * Expected refund amount
      * MOON fees
      * ETH relayer fee

The frontend is informational only; all enforcement is onchain.

# Operating Costs Authorization

This proposal explicitly authorizes the DAO to pay reasonable operating expenses related to the bridge, including but not limited to:

* VPS hosting for relayers
* RPC provider costs
* Frontend website costs
* Monitoring and alerting services
* Domain hosting and frontend infrastructure
* Maintenance and operational tooling

These costs are expected to be modest and covered primarily by relayer fee revenue over time.

# Benefits to the DAO

* Restores seamless MOON mobility between Nova and One
* Improves user experience and accessibility
* Creates a sustainable, usage-based revenue stream
* Keeps critical infrastructure DAO-owned and transparent
* Enables future expansion (additional relayers, optimizations)

# Risks and Disclosures

* This is a liquidity bridge, not a canonical bridge
* Transfers rely on DAO-operated relayers
* Users are subject to liquidity availability
* The bridge will launch with conservative monitoring and the ability to pause

These risks are mitigated through transparency, controls, and phased rollout.

# Proposal Actions

If this proposal passes, the DAO authorizes:

1. Deployment of the MOON Bridge contracts on Arbitrum Nova and Arbitrum One
2. Hosting and maintenance of the frontend at [moonbridge.cc](http://moonbridge.cc)
3. Operation of DAO-controlled relayers via VPS infrastructure
4. Payment of reasonable operating costs associated with the bridge
5. Ongoing operational management by DAO officers under multisig control

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