# BIOPSY-21: Auction Update - Disincentivizing bots & potentially malicious actors

- Space: [BIO](https://snapshot.box/s:bioxyz.eth.md)
- Author: 0x9e67aDFFdfacA157efbC1F0A1785D4D873C20E22
- State: Passed
- Voting type: Basic
- Start: 2025-05-09 15:17 UTC
- End: 2025-05-10 15:17 UTC
- Votes: 24
- Quorum: 97,000,000 voting power
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:bioxyz.eth/proposal/0xbb9a2871a09c62d9c6e5ec05bc3c673cf541dc3b4312cf999be0dfec29c3b7c4

## Results

- For: 166,336,283.17 voting power, 100.0%
- Against: 0 voting power, 0.0%
- Abstain: 0 voting power, 0.0%

## Proposal

## TL;DR


- Impose a **5% fee** on all withdrawals from ongoing uniform‑price auctions (MycoDAO and SpineDAO).<

- **Disable withdrawals in the final 24 hours** of the auctions to prevent last‑minute wash trading behaviour.

- These measures aim to curb bot activity observed during the **MycoDAO** and **SpineDAO** raises




## Context


Bio Protocol Launchpad auctions are [uniform‑price funding mechanisms](https://docs.bio.xyz/bio/introduction/bio-protocol-v1/launchpad/funding/auction) that let BioDAOs exchange a portion of their token supply for treasury capital. While this design removes first‑come‑first‑served gas races, it is still susceptible to bots that deposit and withdraw large amounts in cycles to create the illusion of organic traction.


During the ongoing **MycoDAO** and **SpineDAO** auctions we recorded several wallet clusters repeatedly depositing 50-1,000 SOL at hourly‑to‑daily intervals and withdrawing the full amount once the notional token price had inched upward. Because the clearing price is determined only at the close of the auction, these tactics do **not** generate profit, but they *do*:


- Create noisy spikes in the total raised figure, confusing genuine participants.

- Undermine BioDAOs’ ability to gauge real demand and plan their treasury runway.


Uniform‑price auctions already permit withdrawals at any time before settlement, but without friction this feature is creating noise. Introducing modest friction aligns incentives while preserving legitimate optionality for funders.






## Proposal


### 1. Withdrawal Fee


- **Parameter:** `withdrawFeeBps = 500` (5% of the withdrawn base currency)

- **Applies to:** Every withdrawal transaction initiated *before* the 24‑hour lock described below.


### 2. Withdrawal Restriction (24‑hour lock)


- **Applies to:** All auction participants.

- **Behaviour:** When `auctionEndTime – now ≤ 24h`, the withdraw instruction is disabled for all participants. Deposits remain open until the auction naturally concludes or reaches its hard cap.


## Rationale


- **Discourages non‑committal capital:** A 5 % penalty is small compared to potential upside for genuine supporters but erodes the noisy strategies of manipulative bots.

- **Improves signal‑to‑noise:** Locking withdrawals in the home stretch provides BioDAOs and the community a stable, deterministic view of funds raised.

- **Minimal UX overhead:** Users retain the ability to exit during >90 % of a typical auction.


## Conclusion


These changes will foster a healthier auction environment by discouraging wash trading, giving BioDAOs clearer insight into genuine demand, and producing modest protocol revenue—all while preserving flexibility for committed supporters.

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