# Grants Round 3 (GR3) Framework

- Space: [Big Green DAO](https://snapshot.box/s:biggreendao.eth.md)
- Author: 0x7D4EFd9b4fFECA3e1Db5178f13CeA1eaF69D86d2
- State: Closed
- Voting type: Single choice
- Start: 2022-05-13 16:42 UTC
- End: 2022-05-21 05:59 UTC
- Votes: 15
- Open in Snapshot: https://snapshot.box/#/s:biggreendao.eth/proposal/0x2645aed7ad5ee85e6223ac2ec57d0af54d846c935d7f1c243f12fe385ac6e264

## Results

- Approve GR3 Granting Framework: 14 voting power, 93.3%
- Reject GR3 Granting Framework: 1 voting power, 6.7%

## Proposal

**Summary**
This proposal formalizes Big Green DAO’s Grants Framework for Grants Round 3 (GR3). It will be ratified or amended before Grants Round 4 (GR4).

**Abstract**
- This grants framework will be applied to GR3. 
- **Remove ranked choice voting** round of the granting process, restricting voting to a single quadratic voting round that simultaneously determines which organizations will be funded and how much funding they will receive.
- For GR3, **increase the minimum grant size from $1K to $10K and decrease maximum grant size from $100K to $50K.** 
- The Grants Framework structure and its alignment with Big Green DAO’s First Principles will be assessed following conclusion of GR3 and this framework will be ratified as the default granting framework for GR4 and beyond, or modified accordingly. 

**Motivation**
The Big Green DAO Lite Paper set forth a four-stage process from potential grantee application to fund allocation that involves two distinct voting rounds, first a ranked choice vote, followed by a quadratic vote. 

The aim of this proposal is two-fold: **first, to streamline the grants framework,** reducing it to a single round of quadratic voting, which inherently allows $GARDEN token holders to include a ranked choice mechanism in their vote, by providing a way to express the degree of support for an organization(s).

- For example, a $GARDEN token holder could allocate 50% of their voting power to one organization, 20% to another and 10% to three additional organizations. The quadratic voting formula takes into account both the percentage each $GARDEN token holder allocates to an organization (e.g. 50, 20, 10, 10, 10); as well as how many different $GARDEN token holders in total vote for each organization (e.g. if 10 token holders allocate 10% of their vote to organization A; and 3 token holders allocate 50% of their vote to B - Organization A will receive slightly more funding because it received a greater proportion of total votes, even if it has less relative percentage from each of those votes. In our case, this can be described as a voting strategy that balances between appropriative power (the amount of funds distributed) and democratic power (the amount of votes cast)  in a single voting context.  
- A single-round quadratic vote also increases certainty that organizations who were directly solicited by existing DAO members receive funding; and enables the informal formation of coalitions because the exponential nature of the voting equation allows $GARDEN token holders to vote for multiple organizations, and allocates increased weight (i.e. funds) to organizations that receive both multiple votes from a single source and votes from multiple sources. 
- An example of how quadratic voting works can be found [here](https://wtfisqf.com/?grant=&grant=&grant=&grant=&grant=&grant=&match=100000). For this scenario, imagine a situation where there are 6 organizations that apply for funding, and 6 organizations in the DAO that get 6 votes to distribute among the applicants however they would like, with a total grant pool of $100K.
- An example of how quadratic voting would have worked if the DAO Committee used it in GR2 can be found [here](https://wtfisqf.com/?grant=1&grant=1&grant=1&grant=1&grant=1&grant=1&grant=2&grant=1&grant=1&grant=2&grant=&grant=&match=300000). In this situation there was a grants pool of $300K and each DAO committee member was permitted to nominate 1-2 organizations. 

The second motivation for this proposal is to move toward with **formalization of a grants framework that is both scalable over time, yet allows for manageable growth.** This is being achieved by decreasing the range between the minimum and maximum grant level, making it more manageable for the DAO to fulfill its mandate to give over 20% of the treasury and less than 30% of the treasury each quarter, because it can more easily control for how many organizations are selected in each round without limiting decentralization of power. 
- For example, in the current grants round the DAO is expected to distribute between $581K and $861K USD. The table below depicts variability in the amount of organizations that could be funded based on different minimum and maximum grants thresholds: 

| Min/Max Grant Size      | # of Orgs Funded |
| ----------- | ----------- |
| $1K/$100K    | 6 - 861    |
| $1K/$50K      | 12 - 861   |
| $5K/$100K    | 6-172      |
| $5K/$50K      | 12 - 172    |
| $10K/$100K   | 6 - 86      |
| $10K/$50K  | 12 - 86   |
| $25K/$100K      | 6 - 35      |
| $25K/$50K      | 12 - 35      |

Where as in the default parameter of $1K to $100K grants, it would require issuing grants to a minimum of 6 and maximum of 861, in order to meet the granting mandate; at $10K to $50K the differential is significantly smaller and the results more manageable, requiring a minimum funding of 12 organizations and maximum of 86. 

**Specification**
According to the Big Green DAO Lite Paper, the granting process is divided into four stages:

1. Potential Grantee Submits Big Green DAO Grant Application
2. DAO Committee Vets Applicants for 501c3 & Big Green Charter Alignment
3. DAO Community Ranked Choice Vote to Select Grant Recipient Organizations
4. DAO Community Quadratic Vote to Determine Fund Allocation.

This proposal suggests removing the ranked choice vote phase, **limiting voting to select and fund organizations to a single quadratic vote round, removing the ranked choice voting round.** 

- Quadratic voting is inherently a ranked choice voting system, which enables division of an $GARDEN token voting power between multiple organizations, and further allows for not only expressing support for a potential grantee, but the intensity of support, which equates to the amount of funding that will be allocated. 
- An initial round of ranked choice voting was intended to help prevent application overload, however, it also serves as a gatekeeping mechanism, creating additional friction for organizations seeking grants from the DAO. Removal of the ranked choice voting phase will thus ease applicant pathways into the DAO, and allow a more direct and participatory approach to voting on the way organizations are selected and funded by the DAO.

The Lite Paper further sets forth three primary grant-making parameters:

1. Grantee Organizations must be a 501c3 (or equivalent) and work inline with the Big Green 501c3 Charter
2. The DAO must distribute a minimum of 20% and maximum of 30% of its total treasury per quarter. Undistributed funds beneath this threshold for each quarter will default to Big Green 501c3 for granting.
3. The minimum grant allocation threshold is $1,000 USD and maximum is $100,000

This proposal additionally suggests that for GR3, **the minimum grant allocation be set at $10,000 USD and the maximum grant allocation be limited to $50,000 USD.** With a mandate to distributed between $581K (20%) to $861K (30%), this means that the DAO will fund a minimum of 12 organizations and maximum of 86. At the previous min-max range of $1K to $100K the minimum amount of organizations funded would be 6, and the maximum 861. 

**Voting Options:**
This vote will require ⅔ support amongst participating $GARDEN voting power in order to pass. Followed by a ⅔ DAO Committee ratification of the decision.   

**For:** Approve GR3 Grants Framework

**Against:** Reject GR3 Grants Framework

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